SCKit malware targets ScreenConnect technicians to hijack admin sessions
Blackpoint Cyber reveals SCKit malware exploits patched ScreenConnect flaws and uses RelayTrap to infect technician workstations, stealing session cookies to pivot across customer environments.
A new malware toolkit named SCKit is actively targeting Managed Service Providers (MSPs) by exploiting ConnectWise ScreenConnect deployments. Discovered by Blackpoint Cyber’s Adversary Pursuit Group, the campaign leverages a previously patched critical vulnerability and sophisticated session hijacking techniques to move from compromised endpoints to technician workstations.
The attack does not rely solely on unpatched software but abuses legitimate remote access features to steal administrative credentials. This allows threat actors to bypass multi-factor authentication and propagate malware across multiple customer environments using the trusted connections of support staff.
What happened
Blackpoint Cyber researchers identified that the SCKit toolkit primarily targets CVE-2026-84869, a critical improper privilege management vulnerability in ScreenConnect with a CVSS score of 9.9. Although ConnectWise released a patch for this flaw, which was added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in September 2026, the malware persists by combining exploit attempts with social engineering and session theft. Testing confirmed that fully patched clients block the initial exploit payload, but the toolkit includes alternative methods for intrusion.
The primary vector appears to involve malicious third-party extensions or compromised operator sessions rather than just the unpatched vulnerability itself. ConnectWise has disabled five third-party extensions in partner environments as a precaution, including RMM+, which Huntress found had an authentication flaw allowing blank access keys in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32. While no direct technical link between these extensions and SCKit has been confirmed, the initial access method remains under investigation.
Once inside an endpoint, the malware deploys a component called RelayTrap. This feature is designed to reverse-pivot, meaning it waits for a technician to connect to the infected machine for support. Instead of blocking the technician, the malware attempts to infect their workstation, thereby gaining access to the broader network of customers that the technician manages.
How it works
The infection chain begins when the malware checks for an existing ScreenConnect installation. It then downloads an attacker-controlled MSI installer named "sc.msi," which drops a batch script called "sckit-run.bat." This script contacts the domain "ns.mo7sen[.]dev" to retrieve a PowerShell decoder and deploy the full SCKit toolkit. The toolkit installs unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients to maintain persistent remote control and uses C# code to interfere with legitimate guest sessions.
The core mechanism of RelayTrap involves replacing the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest client with a malicious version. When a technician connects to the compromised endpoint, the malware sends the SCKit payload back to the technician’s machine for execution. If successful, the malware searches the technician’s browser data and process memory for .ASPXAUTH cookies. These cookies represent authenticated management sessions, allowing the attacker to issue commands as the technician without needing passwords or bypassing multi-factor authentication.
By stealing these session tokens, the attacker can execute commands under the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM context on any endpoint the technician manages. This lateral movement allows the threat actor to break out of the initial compromised system and infiltrate other customer environments through the same administrative infrastructure, effectively turning a single support ticket into a widespread breach.
Key details
- Vulnerability exploited: CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9), though patches block the initial exploit payload.
- Malware name: SCKit, featuring a reverse-pivoting component called RelayTrap.
- Initial access: Likely via malicious third-party extensions or compromised sessions; exact entry point unconfirmed.
- Propagation method: Steals .ASPXAUTH cookies from technician browsers to hijack authenticated management sessions.
- Related flaw: Huntress identified an authentication bypass in RMM+ extension versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 due to blank default access keys.
- Vendor response: ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions and advised partners to review security guidance.
Why it matters
For MSPs and IT leads, this campaign highlights a critical blind spot: securing the endpoint is not enough if the administrator’s workstation is vulnerable. Traditional security models focus on protecting customer servers, but SCKit demonstrates that attacking the support channel can be more effective. By targeting the technician, attackers gain a trusted position that bypasses many standard security controls, including MFA, because the session is already authenticated.
This shift in tactics requires a reevaluation of how remote access tools are managed. The abuse of legitimate features like Run Command and file transfer means that detection systems must look for anomalous behavior within trusted sessions, not just external intrusion attempts. Furthermore, the reliance on third-party extensions introduces supply chain risks that vendors may not fully vet, leaving gaps that attackers can exploit even when the core platform is patched.
What you can do
- Patch immediately: Ensure all ScreenConnect clients are updated to the latest version to block CVE-2026-84869 exploits.
- Audit extensions: Review and disable any unnecessary third-party extensions, particularly those flagged by ConnectWise or Huntress.
- Secure technician workstations: Treat support staff machines as high-value targets, enforcing strict endpoint protection and regular monitoring for unusual processes.
- Monitor session activity: Look for rogue Access installations and unusual command history in ScreenConnect logs, especially after support tickets involving suspicious endpoints.
- Validate access keys: If using RMM+ or similar tools, ensure access keys are explicitly configured and not left as blank defaults.
- Isolate compromised endpoints: If an endpoint is suspected of infection, prevent technicians from connecting to it until it has been thoroughly cleaned and forensically analyzed.



